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Abstract
Signcryption is cryptographic primitive which simultaneously provide both the
function of digital signature and public key encryption in a single logical step.
Identity based cryptography is an alternative to the traditional certiﬁcate based
cryptosystem. Its main idea is that each user uses his identity information as his
public key. Many identity based signcryption scheme have been proposed so, far.
However, all the schemes were proven using bilinear pairing.
Elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) have recently received signiﬁcant attention
by research due to their low computational and communicational overhead. Elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC) is the hardest computational problems, the elliptic
curve discrete logarithm problem and elliptic curve Deﬃe-Hellman problem are
the most reliable cryptographic technique in ECC. The advantages of ECC that
it requires shorter key length compared to other public-key algorithms. So, that
its use in low-end systems such as smart cards because of its eﬃciency and limited
computational and communicational overhead.
We introduce new signcryption schemes based on elliptic curve cryptography.
The security of proposed schemes is based on elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem (ECDLP) and elliptic curve Diﬃe-Hellman problem (ECDHP). The
proposed schemes provide various desirable security requirements like conﬁdentiality,
authenticity, non-repudiation and forward security as well as chosen ciphertext
attack and unforgeability.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Security Goals
Network Security is most important to provide security in a public network, because
we place most critical information in this network. To provide security in public
network we must consciously of the three primary goals of network security. These
goals are:
• Conﬁdentiality: Conﬁdentiality ensures that data or information can’t access
by unauthorized users.
• Integrity: This primary goal of network security prevents unauthorized
modiﬁcation of data at the time of transmission.
• Availability: This goal ensures that network resources are always accessible
to authorized parties when needed.
Message encryption and digital signature schemes are cryptographic tools
for providing conﬁdentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation.
Conﬁdential can be achieved by encryption. Integrity, authentication and
non-repudiation can be achieved by digital signature.
1
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1.2 Message Encryption
Encryption is the process of encoding messages that only authorized users can access
it. In an encryption scheme, the message or information, known as plaintext, is
encoding using an encryption algorithm, converted it into an unreadable ciphertext.
This is generally done with the use of an key along with encryption algorithm.
So, any adversary can’t be able to settle anything about the original message. An
authorized user, however, is capable of decode the ciphertext by using a decryption
algorithm, that normally requires a secret decryption key, that adversaries do not
have access to it. Cryptography has two way of an encryption process called
symmetric key encryption and asymmetric key encryption or public key encryption
is given below.
Figure 1.1: Symmetric Key Encryption Process
Figure 1.2: Asymmetric Key Encryption Process
1.3 Digital Signature
Digital signatures rely on certain types of encryption to ensure authentication of
sender. The signature process intended to receiver that the message was sent by
2
Chapter 1 Introduction
sender and nothing modiﬁed at the time of transmission. Digital signatures are
generally made in a two-step. The ﬁrst step is to use a secure hashing algorithm on
the data. Thus, when a signature is veriﬁed by the public key, it decrypts to a hash
matching the message. That hash can only be deciphered by using the public key if
it were encrypted with the private signing key.
Figure 1.3: Digital Signature
1.4 Signature-Then-Encryption
This is a traditional method of providing conﬁdentiality and authentication by using
two serial algorithms [14].
• In ﬁrst step sender sign message using his/her private key for authentication
and then encrypt message using public of receiver.
• At the receiver end, recipient veriﬁes the signature then decrypt the message.
This technique is known as signature-then-encryption. Steps of process are given
in the ﬁgure [1.4].
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Figure 1.4: Signature-Then-Encryption
1.5 Disadvantages of Signature-Then-Encryption
Approach
The disadvantages of traditional signature-then-encryption are in terms of
• Number of bits
• Computational operations
• Size of an entire data packet
In traditional signature-then-encryption, above indicator are increase as compare
to signcryption.
4
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1.6 Signcryption
In cryptography, Signcryption is a public key primitive which full ﬁll both the
functionality of a digital signature and public key encryption in a single logical
step. In the signcryption scheme, the sender generates a one times secret key by
using the recipient’s public key for symmetric key encryption. Then the sender sends
the ciphertext to recipient. After the recipient receives the ciphertext, he derives
same secret key by using his/her private key [14].
Figure 1.5: Signcryption
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1.7 Motivation
Digital signature and message encryption is two cryptographic primitive that
provide security goals like conﬁdentiality, authenticity, non-repudiation, integrity.
Traditional signature-then-encryption process contains two diﬀerent steps to achieve
all these security goals. Signcryption is a cryptography, which provides both the
functionality of digital signature and message encryption in a single logical step.
There are lots of research have been done in signcryption since 1997.
In identity-based signcryption, user identity likes name, email, telephone no. is
used as a public key. A lot of research has been done in identity based signcryption.
However, most of the ID-based signcryption has proven secure in random oracle
model. It is a formal model used in cryptographic proofs, where the one way hash
function is taken as a black box that maps every unique query with a random
response from its output domain. Conversely, it has been proven that security
proofs in the random oracle model doesn’t imply the security in the real world.
Bilinear mapping is a hardest computational problem, which combining the
elements of two vector space to yield an element of another vector space. ID-based
signcryption uses bilinear mapping, which is easy to prove in random oracle model.
However, bilinear mapping has been more computational as well as simulation
overhead as compare to other hardest problems.
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is hardest computational problem and is
based on the algebraic structure of an elliptic curve over a ﬁnite ﬁeld. ECC has
received signiﬁcant research due to their performance, and shorter key compare to
another public-key algorithm.
1.8 Objective of Research
The main objectives we ﬁnd from the motivation to work in signcryption are
discussed as follows:
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• To design a secure identity-based signcryption in the standard model.
Standard model is a computational model in which the attacker have some
limited of time and calculative power available.
• To develop a ID-based signcryption based on hardness of elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC).
• To proof its security goals are under hardness of the elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem (ECDLP) as well as elliptic curve Diﬃe-Hellman problem
(ECDHP).
• To design a strong designation veriﬁable signcryption scheme based on the
elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) and prevent this scheme
from chosen ciphertext attack and unforgeability.
1.9 Organization of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
1. Chapter 1: In this chapter we have discussed about the introduction to
signcryption, motivation and objective of our research.
2. Chapter 2: In this chapter we present the literature review where we have
described some existing works on signcryption.
3. Chapter 3: In this chapter we discussed the mathematical background of thesis
work.
4. Chapter 4: In this chapter we present our proposed ID-based signcryption
scheme based on ECC their implementation.
5. Chapter 5: In this chapter we present our proposed strong designated veriﬁable
signcryption scheme based on ECDLP and their implementation.
6. Chapter 6: At last we concluded in this chapter.
7
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Related Work
2.1 Related Work on Signcryption
Encryption and digital signature schemes are cryptographic tools for providing
conﬁdential, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation. Conﬁdential can be
achieved by encryption. Integrity, authentication and non-repudiation can be
achieved by digital signature. To achieve simultaneously all these goals, the
traditional signature-then-encryption approach is ﬁrst to sign a message and then
to encrypt it. In 1997, Zheng [1] proposed a cryptography primitive that fulﬁll
the function of both digital signature and message encryption simultaneously called
signcryption , and also proved that cost of signcryption is signiﬁcantly lower than
that needed by traditional signature and encryption approach. There are several
signcryption [2–5] have been proposed since 1997.
In the traditional signcryption scheme, the public key of a user is a random
element chosen from a group. So, that signcryption doesn’t provide the
authentication of user by itself because group element cann’t deﬁne the user identity.
This problem can be solved through a certiﬁcate based signcryption, which provides
arrangement that binds public keys with respective user identities by a certiﬁcate
authority (CA). That form a hierarchical structure is called public key infrastructure
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(PKI). A PKI has a diﬃculty for the creation, storage and distribution of digital
certiﬁcates.
To reduce the key management procedure, Shamir [5] introduced the concept of
identity-based cryptosystem. The main idea is that the identity information such as
name, e-mail, telephone no. of each user uses as his public key. In other words, the
identity is used to calculate a user’s public key instead of than being extracted from
a certiﬁcate issued by CA. In ID-Based cryptosystem; users communicate securely
without distributing public key certiﬁcate, without storing public key directory, and
without online participation of a PKG. Malone-lee ﬁrst proposed the identity based
signcryption scheme[6]. There are several ID-based signcryption have been proposed
[5–10].
2.2 Related Work on Signcryption Based on ECC
In 1999, Y. Zheng and H. Imai [2] used the hardness of elliptic curve cryptography
in signcryption and proposed a signcryption scheme based on the elliptic curve
discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). They also proved that signcryption have
approximately, 58% computational cost and 40% of communication cost less than
that of traditional Signature-then-Encryption scheme based on the elliptic curve,
but the scheme was missed of forward secrecy and public veriﬁability.
Later F. Bao, R.H. Deng [11] point out that judge can’t verify sender
authentication without recipient’s private key, so they extended Zheng’s
Signcryption scheme that the judge can verify signature of sender without the
recipient’s private key. C. Gamage et al. [12] was proposed a signcryption scheme
based on Zheng’s Signcryption that anyone can verify the sender authentication,
but the application area was ﬁxed to ﬁrewalls only. H.Y. Jung et al. [13] point
out that when the sender’s private key is lighted, Zheng’s scheme can’t provide
forward secrecy. In 2005, Ren-Junn Hwang [14] proposed a Signcryption scheme
based on Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) and Elliptic Curve
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Diﬃe-Hellman Problem (ECDHP) with forward secrecy and public veriﬁability.
Jun-Bum Shin et al. [15] used a concept of standard DSA algorithm in the
veriﬁcation phase and proposed a DSA-veriﬁable Signcryption scheme, but the
scheme doesn’t provide forward secrecy. Raylin Tso [16] proposed a signcryption
scheme which uses a standard algorithms for veriﬁcation, based on hardness of
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). The scheme was modiﬁed
of Shin et al.’s scheme and also proved the property of forward secrecy.
In 2009, M. Toorani and A. A. Beheshti Shirazi [17] proposed a Signcryption
scheme based on elliptic curved which provide both the properties of forward secrecy
and public veriﬁability.
2.3 Related Work on ID-Based Signcryption
Scheme in Random Oracle Model
In 2002, Malone-Lee [5] uses the concept of identity based cryptography and
signcryption, and designed an identity based signcryption scheme based on bilinear
pairing.
Libert and Quisquart [18] showed that Malone Lee’s proposed scheme has a
problem that the signature of the message is visible in cipher text so, it does
not provide semantically secure. Libert and Quisquart also proposed three IBSC
schemes, but these schemes satisfy either forward security or public veriﬁability.
In 2004 Chow et al. [19] proposed an ID-Based signcryption scheme that allows
for both forward security and public veriﬁability.
Boyen [20] designed an ID-Based signcryption scheme that provides forward
security and public veriﬁability as well as ciphertext anonymity and unlinkability.
After that Malone Lee [21] modiﬁed Boyen’s scheme and construct a more eﬃcient
scheme.
Barreto et al [18] constructed the most reliable and eﬃciency ID-Based
signcryption scheme to date.
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The above ID-Based signcryption schemes are proven secure in the random oracle
model. It is a mathematical model, where hash function is taken as a random
function and is used to analyze cryptography schemes. So, the security proof in the
random oracle model does not imply security in the real world.
2.4 Related Work on ID-Based Signcryption
Scheme in Standard Model
In cryptography, the standard model is a computational model in which the attacker
is only limited of time and computation power available. The security scheme which
are proven secure using the complexity assumption are said to be secure in the
standard model.
In 2009, Yu et al. [8] proposed an ID-Based signcryption scheme is standard
model based on Water’s ID-Based message encryption scheme [14] and pateson’s
and Schuldt’s ID-Based signature scheme.
In 2010, Jin et al [9] point out that Yu et al.’s scheme does not prevent against
adaptive chosen ciphertext attack and proposed a modiﬁed ID-Based signcryption
scheme. Jin et al proved that the modiﬁed scheme is semantically secure in the
standard model.
In 2011, Li et al. [10] pointed that Jin et al. scheme do not have existential
unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks and indistinguishability
against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack . To construct a more ﬂexible scheme
which allow ID and message of arbitrary length, collision resistance hash function
and used a secure one time symmetric key encryption scheme.
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2.5 Related Work on Strong Designation
Veriﬁable Signcryption scheme
In 1996 Jakobsson [22] introduced a strong designated veriﬁer signature scheme in
which the private key of designated veriﬁer is used to verify the validity of signature
and identity of signer. But that scheme has a problem that, the third party can’t
determine whether the signer or designated veriﬁer issued the signature. To overcome
this problem, Saeednia et al. [23] proposed a strong designated veriﬁer scheme.
However, in 2008 Lee-Chang [24] pointed out that Saeednia’s scheme would reveal
the identity of the signer if the secrete key of the signer is compromised means the
signature can be veriﬁed not only with the designated veriﬁer’s secret key but also
the singer’s secret key. To overcome this problem Lee and chang [24] proposed a
designated veriﬁed signature scheme in which a signature can be veriﬁed only with
the designated veriﬁer signature.
In 2012, S. Mohanty and B. Majhi [25] proposed a strong designated veriﬁable
signcryption scheme based on the mechanism of Lee and Chang proposed signature
scheme and incorporated in to signcryption scheme.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed some existing work related to signcryption. A
lots of research have been done in signcryption, we brieﬂy mention some of the work
and it’s ﬂaws.
12
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Mathematical Background
3.1 Mathematics of Cryptography
3.1.1 Modular Arithmetic
Modular arithmetic is deﬁned as a system of arithmetic for integers, where we are
interest in only remainder not quotient [32].
Set of Residues: Zn
A residues modulo n, or Zn is always an integer between 0 and n− 1 or we can
say that a nonnegative integer less than n.
Zn = {0, 1, 2, ...(n− 1)}
Additive Inverse
Additive inverse in set of residues or Zn means, if two numbers x and y are
additive inverse of each other then
x+ y = 0(modn)
Additive inverse of x in modulo n can be calculated as y = n− x. For example,
the additive inverse of 8 in Z12 is 12− 8 = 4.
Multiplicative Inverse
13
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In the set of residues or Zn, if the multiplicative inverse x is y or vice versa,
then xy = 1(modn). For example in Z11, the multiplicative inverse of 2 is 6. In
other word, a integer element x has a multiplicative inverse in Zn if and only if
gcd(n, x) = 1(modn).
In this case, x and n are said to be relatively prime. For example, there is no
multiplicative inverse of 8 in Z10 because gcd(8, 10) = 2 = 1.
The Set Zn and its 3 instances are shown below
1. Zn∗ : The set, Zn∗ is deﬁned as a subset of Zn and it contains elements of set Zn
that have multiplicative inverse. In the set Zn, all the elements have additive
inverse, but only some members have a multiplicative inverse.
Example:
Z7 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} Z7∗ = {1, 3, 7, 9}
2. Zp: In the set Zp, p is a prime number and same as Zn i.e, contains all elements
from 0 to p− 1. In Zp, all the elements.
Note: We need to use Zn when additive inverses are needed; we need to use
Zn∗ when multiplicative inverses.
Example:
Z13 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}
3. Zp∗: In the Set Zp∗, p is a prime number and same as Zn∗ i.e, contains all
the elements from 1 to p − 1. In Zp∗ , all the elements have additive and
multiplicative inverse.
Example:
Z13∗ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}
3.1.2 Algebraic Structures
In this chapter, we brieﬂy discuss the subject of algebraic structure. Algebraic
structure is deﬁned as the set of element with an operation that is applied to the
14
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element of the set. There are three common algebraic structure known as groups,
rings, and ﬁelds [32].
• Groups: A group(G) is deﬁned as a set of elements, which satisﬁes following
four properties with a binary operation, denoted as G =< {...}, • >.
1. Closure: If a, b ∈ G, then c = a • b ∈ G.
2. Associativity: If a, b, c ∈ G, then (a • b) • c = a • (b • c).
3. Identity: ∀a ∈ G, there exists an identity element e, such that e • a =
a • e = a.
4. Inverse: For all a ∈ G, ∃ a′, called the inverse of a, such that a • a′ =
a′ • a = e.
If a group which satisﬁes above four properties along with commutative
property is called commutative group or Abelian group. Commutative
property means ∀a, b ∈ G, we have a • b = b • a.
Finite Group: If a set contains a ﬁnite number of elements, then it is called
ﬁnite group, otherwise it is an inﬁnite group.
Order of a Group: Total number of elements that contains in a group is
called order of a group, i.e, |G|.
Subgroups: A subgroup is a subset of group and subgroup itself is a group.
If G and H are two groups of same operation and elements of H is a subset
of element of G, then H is subgroup of G. The above deﬁnition implies that:
– If a, b ∈ G and H, then c = a • b ∈ G and H.
– Both group and subgroup share the same identity element.
– If a ∈ G and H, then a′ ∈ G and H.
– The group made of identity element of G, H =< {e}, • > is a subgroup
of G.
15
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– Each group is a subgroup of itself.
Cyclic Subgroups: A subgroup of a group is called cyclic subgroup, if all the
elements of group generated using the power of an element. The term power
means repeatedly applying the group operation to the element.
an → a • a • ... • a(n times)
Cyclic Groups: The element that generates all the elements of cyclic
subgroup can also generate all the elements group is called a generator. A
cyclic group is a group that itself own cyclic subgroup. If g is a generator, the
element in the ﬁnite group can be written as
{e, g, g2, ..., gn−1},where gn = e
• Rings: A Ring(R) is a set with two binary operations. It is denoted as
R =< {...}, •, >. The ﬁrst and second operation must satisfy all ﬁve and two
properties respectively. In addition, the second operation must be distributed
over ﬁrst, means that for all a, b, and c elements of R we have a(b • c) =
(ab) • (ac) and (a • b)c = (ac) • (bc). If the second operation satisﬁes
commutative operation, then ring is called commutative ring.
• Fields: A Field(F) is a set of elements with binary operation, denoted as
F =< {...}, •, >. Both two operation satisﬁes all ﬁve properties except the
identity of the ﬁrst operation has no inverse.
3.2 Hash Function
A hash function takes a group of characters and maps it to a value of a certain
length called a hash value or message digest. The hash value is representative of
the original string of characters, but is normally smaller than the original. Hash
function is mainly used to generate a ﬁxed length of string. It is also used to check,
where two objects are same or not. Hash function generates same result, if two
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input string are same, so it is called deterministic. There are diﬀerent type of design
approach of hash function likes MD, MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA, SHA1, SHA2, SHA3.
I have use SHA1 in our scheme.
In our proposed work, we used SHA1 hash function for experimental use. SHA1
takes maximum 264 − 1bit length of input string and generates 160bit length of
output string. SHA1 is collision free hash function, so we used in our proposed
work.
3.3 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) was discovered in 1985 by Victor Miller
(IBM) and Neil Koblitz as an alternative mechanism for implementing public-key
cryptography based on elliptic curve over ﬁnite ﬁeld. ECC is based on discrete
logarithm that is much more diﬃcult to challenge at equivalent key lengths as
compare to other public key cryptography. It uses smaller key as compare to other
public key cryptography with same security level. So, it is used widely in lower
resource system like mobile communication.
3.3.1 Elliptic Curve
An elliptic curve is deﬁne as a nonsingular cubic curve over ﬁnite ﬁeld in two
variables, f(x, y) = 0, with a rational point (which may be a point at inﬁnity)
which satisfy the equation: y2 = x3 + ax + b. The ﬁeld K is generally taken to be
the complex numbers, reals, rationales, or a ﬁnite ﬁeld.
3.3.2 Why ECC?
The National Institute of Standards and Technology recommended the key sizes to
protect keys used in conventional encryption algorithms like the (DES) and (AES)
together with the key sizes for RSA, Diﬃe-Hellman and elliptic curves that are
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needed to provide equivalent security are given in the Table [3.1].
Table 3.1: Key sizes for equivalent security levels (in bits)
Symmetric ECC DH/DSA/RSA
80 163 1024
128 283 3072
192 409 7680
256 571 15360
From given table, we conclude that if the symmetric key size is increase the
required key sizes for RSA and Diﬃe-Hellman increase at a much faster rate than
the required key sizes for elliptic curve cryptosystems. Hence, elliptic curve systems
oﬀer more security per bit increase in key size than either RSA or Diﬃe-Hellman
public key systems [35].
3.3.3 Elliptic Curves over GF(p)
An elliptic curve E over R (real numbers) is deﬁned by a Weierstrass equation
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6
The Weierstrass equations can be simpliﬁed by performing the following change of
variables:
(x, y) → (x− a2
3
, y − a1x+ a3
2
)
and set a1 = 0, a3 = 0
a =
1
9a22
+ a4, b =
2
27a32
− 1
3a2a4a6
we get one of the simpliﬁed Weierstrass equations:y2 = x3 + ax + b where a, b ∈ Fp
and 4a3 + 27b2 = 0, together with a special point 0 called the point at inﬁnity.
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Figure 3.1: Elliptic Curve
Point addition
Addition of two point in elliptic curve is deﬁned as a line between two point and
the intersection of line in the elliptic curve. The negative of the intersection point
is used as the result of the addition.
The operation is denoted by P +Q = R, or (xp, yp)+ (xq, yq) =(xr, yr). This can
algebraically be calculated by:
λ =
yq − yp
xq − xp
xr = λ
2 − xp − xq
yr = λ(xp − xr)− yp
Figure 3.2: Point Addition Image
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Point doubling
Point doubling in elliptic curve is deﬁned as a tangent of the point and the
intersection of line in the elliptic curve. The negative of the intersection point is
used as the result of the addition.
λ =
3x2p + a
2yp
xr = λ
2 − 2xp
yr = λ(xp − xr)− yp
Figure 3.3: Point Doubling Image
Point multiplication
Point multiplication is nothing but scalar multiplication is deﬁned as repeated
addition of point. There is a method for point multiplication called double
and square method, which is similar to multiply and square method in modular
exponentiation. The algorithm is given as follows:
For computing dP, take the binary representation for d : d = d0 + 2d1 + 2
2d2 +
· · ·+ 2mdm, where [d0..dm] ∈ 0, 1
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3.4 Elliptic Curve Hardest Problem
This section describes deﬁnition of the hard computational problems in which the
security of the proposed scheme relies [27].
3.4.1 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
With the given two point of an elliptic curve A and B, where A = k.B, it is diﬃcult
to ﬁnd out the value of k.
3.4.2 Elliptic Curve Diﬃe-Hellman Problem
With the given two points of elliptic curve A and B, where A = c.G and B = d.G
without c and d, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd out another point K = c.d.G.
The ECDLP and ECDHP is a computational infeasible problems [30].
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we brieﬂy discussed mathematical background of our thesis work.
All the mathematics we deﬁne are being use in our proposed work.
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ID-based Signcryption Scheme
Based on ECC
In this chapter, we proposed an identity based signcryption scheme based on elliptic
curve cryptography. The scheme, based on the concept of Li et al. [10], which allow
ID and message of arbitrary length, collision resistance hash function and used a
secure one time symmetric key encryption scheme.
4.1 Formal model of identity-based signcryption
An identity-based signcryption scheme consists of the following four algorithms [8].
• Setup: Here, the private key generator (PKG) takes input as security
parameter k and generates the system’s public parameters params and a
master secret s. PKG publishes params and keeps the master secret to itself.
• Extract: Given an identity IDu, the PKG computes the corresponding private
key xu and transmits it to its owner in a secure way.
• Signcrypt: To send a message m from Alice to the receiver Bob whose identity
is IDb, Alice computes cipher text c using algorithm Signcrypt(m, xa, yb).
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• Unsigncrypt: After receiving ciphertext c, Bob computes
Unsigncrypt(c, ya, xb) and generates the plain text m if the ciphertext is
valid between two identities otherwise the symbol ⊥.
4.2 Proposed Scheme
This scheme consists of three parts, namely PKG, Signcryptor and Receiver. The
PKG provides private and public key of all parties, when they join ﬁrst time in the
network. There are four phases in the proposed scheme: Setup, Extract, Signcrypt,
Unsigncrypt. In the initial phase, the system chooses and publishes all the parameter
of elliptic curves and PKG generates private key and the related public key of each
user in the network.
• Setup: Here, PKG selects and publish system security parameters are given
below.
q is a large prime number.
(a, b) two elliptic curve element which is smaller than q satisfying the equation
4a3 + 27b2 = 0 and q = 0.
F the elliptic curve over ﬁnite ﬁeld which satisfying the equation q : y2 =
x3 + ax+ b mod q.
G a generator of elliptic curve.
0 a point at inﬁnity of elliptic curve and n the order of F , which satisfy n.G = 0.
Hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq and PKG choose a number s as master secret
and compute master public key R = s.G.
Publish parameter (q, G, a, b,H,R).
• Extract: If U has the identity IDu, the PKG computes the private key of
signcryptor as follows.
Xu = (H(IDu)).s mod q
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and compute its public key as Yu = Xu.G
The PKG generates private and public key of the sender and receiver as
follows.
Xs = (H(IDs)).s mod q (4.1)
Ys = Xs.G (4.2)
Xr = (H(IDr)).s mod q (4.3)
Yr = Xr.G (4.4)
• Signcrypt: Sender chooses a random number r ∈ [1....(q− 1)] and computes,
Z = r.G (4.5)
K = IDr.r.Yr = (K1, K2) (4.6)
c = EK1(m) (4.7)
h = Hash(m, IDs, IDr, K2) (4.8)
S = IDr.r − IDs.h.Xs.Z (4.9)
The cipher text is (c, h, S, Z)
• Unsigncrypt:The receiver receives ciphertext (c, h, S, Z), and computes,
K = S.Yr + IDs.h.Z.Ys.Xr = (K1, K2) (4.10)
m′ = DK1(c) (4.11)
h′ = Hash(m′, IDs, IDr, K2) (4.12)
Verify, if (h = h′) then receiver accepts the signature.
4.3 Security analysis of the proposed scheme
In this section, the correctness of the proposed signcryption scheme is evaluated.
Then, there is a brief discussion of the security aspects of the proposed scheme. We
also proof that the proposed scheme provides all the security goals.
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4.3.1 Correctness
The signcrypted text (c, h, S, Z) is a valid one; its correctness is given below.
K = S.Yr + IDs.h.Z.Ys.Xr
= (IDr.r − IDs.h.Xs.Z).Yr + IDs.h.Z.Ys.Xr
= IDr.r.Yr − IDs.h.Xs.Z.Yr + IDs.h.Z.Ys.Xr
= IDr.r.Yr − IDs.h.Z.Xs.Yr + IDs.h.Z.Xs.G.Xr
= IDr.r.Yr − IDs.h.Z.Xs.Yr + IDs.h.Z.Xs.Yr
= IDr.r.Yr
4.3.2 Security Proof
The proposed work provides message conﬁdentiality, integrity, authentication,
non-repudiation, unforgeability, and forward secrecy.
Conﬁdentiality
The proposed scheme provides message conﬁdentiality. If an attacker tries to obtain
the original message from the ciphertext, he must know the secret parameter K.
Now we discuss some ways that attacker can try to obtain the secret key K.
K = IDr.r.Yr (4.13)
Z = r.G (4.14)
Suppose the attacker tries to derive secret key K from Eq. (4.13), he must ﬁnd out
secret parameter r from Eq. (4.14). But the Eq. (4.14) has properties ECDLP. So,
it is infeasible to solve to derive K from Eq. (4.13) and (4.14).
R = s.G (4.15)
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K = H(IDr).IDr.r.s.G (4.16)
If the attacker tries to derive secret K, by using Eq. (4.16) from Eq. (4.14) and Eq.
(4.15), then attacker has to solve the hardest ECDHP.
S = IDr.r − IDs.h.Xs.R (4.17)
K = S.Yr + IDr.h.Z.Ys.Xr (4.18)
It is also possible to derive K from Eq. (4.18) by using Eq. (4.17), but the
attacker has to gotten Xr, which is infeasible to derive. Therefore, proposed scheme
provides message conﬁdentiality.
Authentication
The recipient uses public key Ys and certiﬁcate S in Eq. (4.18) for verifying sender
authentication. The sender signed with its private key Xs in Eq. (4.17). So, in the
proposed scheme recipient can authenticate identity of sender.
Integrity
In the proposed scheme, the receiver can verify that whether the ciphertext is
tampered or not at the time of transmission.
h = Hash(m, IDs, IDr, K2) (4.19)
If the attacker change the cipher text c to c′. Then the original message in Eq.
(4.19) also change from m to m′. At the time of veriﬁcation it is infeasible in one
way hash function that h = h′. Therefore, our scheme provides integrity.
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Unforgeability
Unforgeability ensure that, the attacker can’t create a valid ciphertext. In the
proposed scheme, the attacker cannot create a valid (c, h, S, Z) without the private
key of the sender. If an attacker forge a valid (c,′ , h′, S ′, Z ′) from previous (c, h, S, Z),
then (c′, h′, S ′, Z ′) has to satisfy Eq. (4.18).
To generate a correct h′ and S ′, the attacker must get random secret r. But the
attacker can’t get the correct random secret r and S. To obtain r from Z = r.G,
then attacker should have to solve ECDLP ﬁrstly but it computationally infeasible.
Therefore, proposed scheme prevents the properties of unforgeability.
Non-Repudiation
In proposing schemes the recipient can know from Eq. (4.18), whether the original
message send by sender or not. As the sender sign with his private key in Eq. (4.17),
the recipient can verify. So proposed scheme provides non-repudiation.
Forward Secrecy
The proposed scheme ensures that, if the sender private key is lighted, but attacker
can’t recover original message m from ciphertext (c, h, S, Z). In our scheme if an
attacker tries to derive plain text m, he has to decrypt its cipher text by secret key
K. Therefore our proposed scheme provides forward secrecy.
4.4 Comparison
We compare cost of our proposed work with some elliptic curve cryptography
schemes and try to reduce the cost of computation. We have used some notation to
deﬁne number of operation, in the Table [4.1] are given below.
MUL= modular multiplication operation.
DIV= modular division operation.
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ADD= modular addition operation.
ECPM= elliptic curve point multiplication operation.
ECPA= elliptic curve point addition operation.
HASH= one way hash function.
Table 4.1: Comparison based on the Computational Cost
Schemes MUL DIV ADD ECPM ECPA HASH
Hwang 1 0 1 5 1 2
Zheng 3 1 1 3 1 4
Proposed
Scheme
3 0 1 5 0 2
4.5 Implementation
All the security schemes are operated by large number to protect diﬀerent type of
attacks. Java has a special class for implementing security schemes, called BigInteger
class. The proposed scheme is implemented using java BigInteger class.
4.5.1 Block Diagram of Classes
The proposed scheme is using three classes that are given in the Fig.[4.1].
Signcryption.java, class is the base class, where the algorithm of the scheme is
implemented. ECC.java class contains the elliptic curve parameters and diﬀerent
point operation. There is another class, that deﬁnes the x and y coordinates of
elliptic curve points as well as some methods.
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Figure 4.1: Block Diagram of Classes
4.5.2 Snapshot of Output
In our scheme we have used the SHA1, a one way hash function that take variable
length of input and generates a 160bits of output. The elliptic parameters are chosen
randomly and generate points in the curve. It takes an arbitrary length of message
and calculates the cipher text and sends it to recipient. At the recipient end verify
the signature and decrypt the message. The snapshot of the output is given below
in Fig.[4.2].
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have described our proposed ID-based Signcryption Scheme Based
on ECC. The proposed scheme consist of three algorithm and two diﬀerent parties.
We proof, the correctness of the scheme and also diﬀerent type security goals that
satisy the scheme.
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Figure 4.2: Snapshot of Output
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A Strong Designated Veriﬁable
Signcryption Scheme Based on
ECDLP
In this chapter, we proposed a Strong Designated Veriﬁable Signcryption Scheme
Based on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. The scheme, based on the S.
Mohanty and B. Majhi [25] proposed a strong designated veriﬁable signcryption
scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP).
5.1 Existing Scheme
In this section, there is a brief discussion of S. Mohanty and B. Majhi [25] proposed
scheme. The scheme consists of three algorithms, namely, setup, signcryption and
unsigncryption with veiﬁcaion.
• Setup: The signcryptor(S) chooses n = p.q, where p = 2fq′ and q = 2fq′ +1.
p, q, p′, q′ are distinct primes.
The signcryptor chooses his private key XS ∈ Zq∗ and computes his public key
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as follows.
YS = g
XS mod p
The designated veriﬁer also chooses his private key XR ∈ Zq∗ and computes
his public key as follows.
YR = g
XR mod p
• Signcryption: The signcryptor chooses t ∈ Zq∗ and computes
K = YR
t mod p
C = EK(m)
r = H(K)
s = t− r.XS mod p
The signcryptor send the cipher text δ = (r, s, C) to designated veriﬁer.
• Unsigncryption: After receiving δ = (r, s, C), the designated receiver
computes K ′ as given below.
K ′ = (gSYSr)XR mod p
Then he veriﬁes the authenticity of sender by checking the following condition.
r = H(K ′)
Then message m is recovered from the ciphertext as follows.
m = Dk(C)
5.2 Proposed Scheme
This scheme consists of two parties namely Signcryptor and Receiver. There are
three phases in the scheme : Setup or key generation, Signcrypt and Unsigncrypt.
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In the initial phase, signcryptor generates and publishes all the public parameter
of elliptic curve as well as each user chooses his own private key and calculates his
related public key.
• Setup: In this phase, signcryptor setup some elliptic curve parameter are
given below.
q is a prime number.
(a, b) two integer element and (a, b) < q satisfy 4a3 + 27b2 = 0 mod q.
F is the elliptic curve over ﬁnite ﬁeld with order n, which satisfy equation
y2 = x3 + ax+ b mod q.
G a base point of F .
hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq.
Publish parameter(q, G, a, b,H, n).
Signcryptor chooses his private key Xs ∈ [1, 2...(n−1)] and computes his public
key as
Ys = Xs.G = (Ys1, Ys2) (5.1)
Receiver also chooses his private key Xr ∈ [1, 2...(n − 1)] and computes his
public key as
Yr = Xr.G = (Yr1, Yr2) (5.2)
• Signcrypt:Signcryptor chooses a random number t ∈ [1....(n − 1)] and
computes
K = t.Yr = (K1, K2) (5.3)
c = EK1(m) (5.4)
r = H(m,K2) (5.5)
s = (t− r.Xs) mod n (5.6)
The cipher text is δ = (c, r, s)
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• Unsigncrypt:The receiver receives ciphertext δ = (c, r, s) and computes
K ′ = s.Yr + r.Xr.Ys = (K ′1, K ′2) (5.7)
The message is recovered from the cipher text δ = (c, r, s) as follows.
m′ = DK ′1(c) (5.8)
Then he veriﬁes the authenticity by checking the following condition.
r′ = H(m′, K ′2) (5.9)
5.3 Security analysis of the proposed scheme
In this section, the correctness of the proposed signcryption scheme is evaluated.
Then, there is a brief discussion of the security proof of the diﬀerent type attack
that the proposed scheme provides.
5.3.1 Correctness
The signcrypted text δ = (c, r, s) is a valid one; its correctness is given below.
K = s.Yr + r.Xr.Ys
= (t− r.Xs).Yr + r.Xr.Ys
= t.Yr − r.Xs.Yr + r.Xr.Xs.G
= t.Yr − r.Xs.Yr + r.Xs.Yr
= t.Yr = (K1, K2)
5.3.2 Security Proof
Deﬁnition 1: A signcryption scheme is said to have the indistinguishability against
adaptive chosen ciphertext attack property, if no polynomially bounded adversary
has a non-negligible advantages in the following game [8].
34
Chapter 5A Strong Designated Verifiable Signcryption Scheme Based on ECDLP
1. The challenger C runs the setup algorithm with security parameters and
obtains common parameters params. He sent the parameter to adversary A.
2. The adversary A asks adaptively a polynomially bounded number of queries
to signcryption and unsigncryption.
• signcryption queries: In this phase, adversary chooses a message m along
with an arbitrary recipient public key Yr and sends them to the challenger.
Then the challenger, runs the signcryption algorithm signcrypt(m,Xs, Yr)
with private key of signcryptor Xs and send ciphertext back to adversary.
• unsigncryption queries: In this phase, adversary A submits a ciphertext
C for decryption to the challenger. Then the challenger runs the
signcrypt algorithm unsigncrypt(C,Xr, Ys). If the plaintext is valid for
the recovered signcryptor’s public key, then the challenger returns the
plaintext to A, otherwise the challenger returns the symbol ⊥.
3. A chooses two plaintexts, m0 andm1, and an arbitrary private keyXs, on which
he wishes to be challenged. Challenger chooses randomly a bit b, computes
δ=Signcrypt(mb, Xs, Yr) and sends it to A.
4. A asks a polynomial number of queries adaptively again as in the ﬁrst stage.
It is not allowed to make query the unsigncryption corresponding to δ.
5. Finally, A produces a bit b′ and wins the game if b′ = b. The advantage of A
is given as
Adv(A) = Pr[b′ = b]− 1/2
Proof: We proof the scheme based on above game that, the proposed scheme
is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.
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We assume that, the adversary chooses a signcryptor’s private key and two
messagem0 andm1 of equal length and send them to challenge. The challenger
then chooses a random b and compute the ciphertext δ with given receiver
public key Yr.
δ = (c, r, s)
Adversary after receiving the challenge ciphertext δ, he ﬁrst guess of b and
generates a new ciphertext by choosing a random messagem′. Then he chooses
a random X ′s ← zq∗. Then A computes,
Y ′s = X
′
s.G (5.10)
K ′ = t′.Yr = (K ′1, K
′
2) (5.11)
c′ = EK ′1(m
′) (5.12)
r′ = H(m′, K ′2) (5.13)
s′ = (t′ − r′.X ′s) mod n (5.14)
The adversary then send the challenge ciphertext δ′ to challenger for
unsigncryption. After receiving ciphertext δ′ = (c′, r′, s′), the challenger
computes K = s′.Yr + r′.Xr.Ys = (K1, K2) and m′ = DK1(c)
If r = H(m′, K ′2), then challenger returns the message m, otherwise rejects the
message. The response is automatically rejected because K ′ = K as X ′r can
not be computed from Yr, whose complexity elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem. So, we conclude that proposed scheme is prevent against adaptive
chosen ciphertext attack.
Deﬁnition 2: The proposed signcryption scheme is unforgeable against chosen
message attack.
proof: In proposed work, the attacker cannot create a valid ciphertext (c, r, s)
without private key of sender. The computational complexity of sender private key
is under hardness of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.
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In case, the value K is leaked or compromised, the attacker can not generates s as
it required two parameter, t and Xs. If attacker want to derive t from K = t.Yr, he
should have to solve ECDLP ﬁrstly, it computationally infeasible. Therefore, the
proposed scheme satisfy the properties of unforgeability.
Deﬁnition 3: In proposed signcryption scheme the signcrypted message can not
verify other than the designated receiver
Proof: In proposed scheme, one time symmetric key is generated using public
key of designated receiver. To veriﬁed signcrypted message, one time symmetric
key is generated from private key of designated receiver that is computationally
hardness under ECDLP.
If the the private key of signcryptor(Xs) is compromised, the adversary A
generates the signcrypted text δ before the designated receiver R receive it, the
adversary can not verify the signature, because the signature is only veriﬁed by
designated receiver that is protected under hardness of ECDLP.
5.4 Implementation
We implement this scheme in java using java BigInteger class. In this work, we
used SHA1 a one way hash function, an elliptic curve class and a point class. The
algorithm generates all elliptic curve points by choosing elliptic curve parameters.
From all points one of the points chosen as generator, which can generate all the
points of elliptic curve by scalar multiplication. Then the algorithm calculates
privates and public key of sender and receiver using generator. In signcryption
phase, sender calculates cipher text and sends it to receiver. In unsigncryption
phase, receiver veriﬁes sender identity and decrypts the message. The snapshot of
output is given below in Fig.[5.1].
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Figure 5.1: Snapshot of Output
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced a strong designated veriﬁable signcryption
scheme based on ECDLP. We also proved that, the proposed scheme is secure against
chosen ciphertext attack and unforgeability. We have implemented this scheme in
java and result is also given.
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Conclusion
Our proposed schemes based on ECDLP and ECDHP simultaneously provides
message conﬁdentiality, unforgeability, non-repudiation, integrity, authentication
and forward security. The proposed schemes achieve the security properties with
a saving in computational cost compared to the traditional signature the encryption
scheme which makes the new scheme more appropriate for environment with limited
power. Finally, the proposed schemes have low computational and communication
cost so, can be applied to a smart phone environment more eﬃciently.
Scope for Further Research
In ID-based signcryption, a third is used to generate the private key of users called
a private key generator (PKG). There is a problem of key escrow in ID-based
signcryption that key is held in escrow, or stored, by a third party. So, to avoid
this problem the proposed works can be design in certiﬁcateless signcryption.
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